The parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7 in Armenia are increasingly being described as the first genuinely “geopoliticized” elections in the country’s post-independence history. While external actors have influenced earlier electoral cycles indirectly, the current contest is unfolding in a context where foreign policy orientation, security guarantees, and regional realignments are no longer background conditions but central issues in domestic political competition.

This shift is largely the result of Armenia’s transformed security and geopolitical environment following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the subsequent restructuring of its regional posture. Competing political forces now openly advance divergent strategic visions: some advocate deeper integration with the West and greater diversification away from Russia, while others emphasize restoring and maintaining close ties with Moscow as a key pillar of security and regional stability. Electoral competition, accordingly, extends beyond domestic governance to questions of long-term geopolitical alignment.

Against this backdrop, concerns over external influence have become more prominent in political discourse. Russia is frequently cited as a potentially influential actor through economic dependence, energy links, media ecosystems, and information operations. At the same time, Western diplomatic activity in Armenia has also drawn scrutiny, with high-level visits and multilateral engagements interpreted by some as implicit political signaling ahead of the vote, while others frame them as part of Armenia’s broader diplomatic diversification.

The stakes are further elevated by the interests of regional powers, especially Turkey and Azerbaijan, whose policies and post-conflict objectives continue to shape Armenia’s security environment and influence debates over peace, borders, and regional connectivity.

In this context, the June elections are widely seen as more than a domestic political contest: they are increasingly interpreted as a referendum—explicit or implicit—on Armenia’s geopolitical trajectory in a rapidly evolving regional order.

Russia’s Alleged Two-Phase Strategy and Electoral Interference 

In an interview with Caucasus Watch, political analyst Hovsep Khurshudyan suggested that Russia’s interference in Armenia’s elections is being planned in two phases, A and B, with phase A covering the period before the elections and phase B covering the period after them.

“Russia is currently attempting Plan A, which is mainly expressed through informational and hybrid forms of pressure—particularly disinformation, which, as we can see, is being actively spread. This also includes vote-buying, which is itself a violation of the law, but is being widely used by their sponsored proxies. This is especially evident in the case of Samvel Karapetyan’s political force. There have already been arrests and detentions, as well as the publication of intercepted communications. However, it appears that they have the impression that they will not succeed in taking power in Armenia through a planned approach—that is, in turning Armenia into a state dependent on their political line and on the Kremlin in general. As a result, they are now moving much more actively toward preparing Plan B. The recent statement by Konstantin Zatulin, suggesting that Russia should not recognize the election results if the current authorities are re-elected, is precisely part of this line of thinking. What does it mean not to recognize the election results? It means giving grounds to the forces that will not pass or, at the very least, will not come to power, to start extra-parliamentary unrest in the streets, create tension, and take certain actions. This is also what Putin's recent statements are aimed at, when he constantly reminded us the “Ukrainian scenario”, which they call a "special operation". He said Russia has no issue with Ukraine—or even Armenia—pursuing closer ties with the EU but claimed that in Ukraine the problem was a coup and seizure of power that violated Russian interests. The situation in Armenia is somewhat different. Here, a coup could only be carried out by their own proxies, since the current government obviously has no need for one—it is already in power. However, by refusing to recognize the election results, they could portray the re-election of the current government as a “coup.” In other words, they might claim that the authorities allegedly rigged the elections or seized power, labeling them as illegitimate and potentially using that narrative to justify certain actions. I cannot say whether they would go so far as to carry out a military operation like in Ukraine, although they do not share a common border. For example, they might attempt some kind of airborne operation, since the forces stationed at the military base are not sufficient to conduct such an operation against the Armenian army, but we also do not know what kind of agent network they may have within our security structures. No matter how thoroughly the current authorities have cleared these structures of agents, we cannot be certain they will fully serve Armenia’s sovereign interests, rather than that some elements may still serve Russia. Even a limited presence of such influence could create serious problems. Moreover, even the perception of this possibility could be used to justify more forceful Kremlin intervention. And if the Kremlin concludes it lacks any foothold within Armenia’s state system, it may see the situation as one that cannot be influenced through street action alone. There have already been several rallies, but they have failed. This is especially about the integrity of the state system and its commitment to Armenia’s sovereignty. They will simply be left with no option other than resorting to an armed coup. If the people re-elect the current government, or if it forms a coalition with other democratic forces in the event of not securing enough votes, then they will be left with no alternatives. The forces opposing the current government are not as strong, either in terms of resources or the commitment of their supporters, as the democratic movements that in the past challenged autocracy in Armenia. For this reason, they cannot be relied upon. They may create noise in the streets for a few days and then disperse without achieving any meaningful result. Therefore, the current authorities must remain especially vigilant in ensuring national control over state institutions,” Khurshudyan notes.

EU Role and Regional Implications of the Elections

Regarding the European Union's intervention, political scientist Khurshudyan does not share the claims sometimes made by critics that the EU's sending a group against hybrid warfare means interference in the elections. On the contrary, he believes that it would be interference if they were waging a hybrid war or launching hybrid challenges, but, according to the political scientist, they are only assisting the Armenian state fight against external hybrid threats. 

“Calling it interference is absurd. In other words, if someone attacks Armenia and Europeans help us with weapons, then accusing Europe of interfering in our internal affairs would be equally absurd. Hybrid threats are a form of information warfare—one that requires allies, tools, and assistance—and it is positive that the European Union is providing support in this regard. Secondly, the EU’s political support is equally important, given that if Russia’s so-called Plan B were to be activated, the Kremlin should understand that the European Union would provide full political backing to Armenia. This applies not only to the EU, but also to the United States and the West more broadly. It is clear that if their puppets resort to illegal actions in support of a potential military coup, this would in no way be considered within the framework of human rights, freedom of assembly, or freedom of expression. In such a case, of course, it would be necessary to take firm measures—something the European Union appears ready to support, as it did in Moldova,” Khurshudyan alludes.

Turkey and Azerbaijan: Strategic Calculations and Post-Election Scenarios

Regarding Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s interests in the Armenian elections, according to Hovsep Khurshudyan, neither Turkey nor especially Azerbaijan particularly cares about the outcome. In either case, they have their own action plans in place.

“If the elections proceed peacefully and normally, and a government is elected through the will of the people, I believe it will be a democratic government rather than a pro-Russian one, and in that case the peace process will continue. Neither Azerbaijan nor Turkey has any problem with that; for them, it is a normal scenario. If pro-Russian forces come to power and Russia attempts to use them to escalate tensions with Azerbaijan or create security challenges, I do not believe this would be a major problem for Aliyev. On the contrary, he could even benefit from it, using it as a pretext to accuse Armenia of being the aggressor. At the very least, he could raise such claims and potentially consider himself released from the already initialed peace agreement, with all the consequences that would follow. For example, with the prospect of using force to secure a corridor in Syunik, potentially with support from Turkey. And I am confident that in such a case, Russia would not support Armenia, but would instead reach an understanding with Azerbaijan under which its forces would oversee the route, as in the November 9 agreement, while ensuring it remains fully unobstructed for Azerbaijan in the form it envisions—effectively at the expense of Armenia’s sovereignty,” Hovsep Khurshudyan concludes.

Hybrid Threats and the Politics of Interpretation

Our other interlocutor, Dr. Arman Grigoryan, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, believes that foreign interference in the Armenian elections is already clearly present.

“Many external players and actors have openly expressed their support for Nikol Pashinyan, including the leaders of the EU and the US (when Vance was in Armenia), there were also statements from Azerbaijan and Turkey. The statements coming from Azerbaijan are somewhat threatening in nature — suggesting that if Pashinyan is not re-elected, it could lead to war, confrontation, and so forth. In the support being shown by the EU, I see something Orwellian — particularly in the sense that it is being provided under the pretext of combating hybrid interference and attacks. One does not need to fall into the trap of elaborate conspiracy theories to understand where those resources will be directed — to which political forces and NGOs. Those same forces did not utter a word regarding the statements by Vance or Macron; their sole focus is Russia. 

Nevertheless, Arman Grigoryan does not rule out the possibility that Russia, too, intends to interfere in Armenia’s elections and may already be carrying out certain actions toward that end. According to the political science professor, this should not come as a surprise: anyone who has studied international relations understands that major powers often intervene in the internal affairs of countries where they have strategic interests, including in electoral processes and other domestic matters.

“But what is happening in Armenia now is essentially a search for so-called hybrid threats, and it reminds me of what happened in the United States in 2016 during Trump’s election, when massive hysteria erupted and a narrative was constructed claiming that Russia had played a role in Trump’s victory. It is a narrative that has been cultivated over the years, often without any factual basis or evidence. And I must say that those promoting this narrative have succeeded in creating an atmosphere in Armenia suggesting that the country is under a Russian hybrid war and that Russia is attempting to interfere in these elections. In reality, this also serves another purpose: the authorities have managed to frame the situation in such a way that virtually any criticism directed at Nikol Pashinyan is now effectively portrayed as foreign interference. Concrete evidence of Russian interference is very limited. The only example, perhaps, is President Putin’s remark during his most recent meeting with Pashinyan, where he noted that pro-Russian forces should not be marginalized and should be allowed to participate in the elections,” notes Arman Grigoryan.

The Question of Security Guarantees

The political scientist is convinced that, following the 2020 war and especially after the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, a policy has been pursued to change Armenia’s strategic orientation. In particular, an attempt is being made to, so to speak, “liberate” Armenia from the Russian yoke and from the burden of being its ally, and to advance a policy of integration with the West.

“I believe this reflects a fairly clear preference on the part of the authorities, as well as the many supporting political forces and numerous civil society organizations, and it is something that is openly acknowledged and discussed. If Armenia continues along this policy trajectory and brings it to a successful conclusion, I can assure you that the security guarantees we currently have under the existing Armenian–Russian status quo — which many may be dissatisfied with, me included — will not be replaced by anything comparable. But even if this imperfect level of security currently provided by Russia were absent, Europe and the United States would not replace it in any meaningful way. They have no intention of providing us with any serious security guarantees. When we look at the TRIPP document, there is a specific clause stating that it does not entail any security guarantees. In other words, they felt it necessary to include this in the document so that Armenians would not develop any different expectations, or so that, in the event of future problems, there would be nothing that could be held against them. There was also no reference to security guarantees in the strategic cooperation agreement during the Biden administration, nor in NATO meetings. At most, what we can talk about are weapons purchased from France, which in reality can hardly be considered security guarantees — in some cases, they may even make matters worse. Since we know that Russia strongly and firmly resists any attempt by the West to establish a military-strategic presence within the borders of the former Soviet Union, it is not difficult to predict that this would also face resistance in Armenia’s case. The Russians have numerous levers to exert pressure on Armenia, and I do not think they would accept this very calmly,” Arman Grigoryan notes. 

Regional Dynamics, Long-Term Risks, and Strategic Consequences

In contrast to our previous interlocutor, Arman Grigoryan is also convinced that Russia would not even need to resort to any military coup or intervention in Armenia, as it did in Ukraine, because Armenia is so economically dependent on Russia, including on subsidized Russian gas and other factors.

“In that case, it would be necessary not only to replace the Russian security guarantees against Azerbaijan and Turkey, but also to obtain guarantees against Russia itself. But if the West is unwilling to provide us with guarantees against Azerbaijan, it is even less likely to extend such guarantees against Russia. The examples of Ukraine and Georgia are telling in this regard. Therefore, when I look at it from the perspective of Azerbaijan and Turkey, and at Pashinyan’s policies, I understand very clearly that what Pashinyan is doing will ultimately leave Armenia in a much more vulnerable and unprotected position, making it much easier for Azerbaijan to extract further concessions from Armenia,” Grigoryan alludes.

Based on Azerbaijan’s rhetoric, the political scientist does not get the impression that they intend to de-escalate, reconcile, or pursue peace. And even if they do think about peace, according to Arman Grigoryan, it would amount to a ‘Versailles peace’ — one that involves constant pressure on Armenia, the restriction of its freedom of action, and the imposition of ever-new demands.

“Ilham Aliyev openly speaks about resettling 300,000 Azerbaijanis in Armenia, and substantial funds are being invested in this effort. He refers to Armenia as ‘Western Azerbaijan,’ and under such circumstances, to claim that Armenia will not need any security guarantees is, in my view, simply madness. Pashinyan is so keen to sign any agreement that would fundamentally redefine Armenia’s relations with Russia that he appears willing to make virtually any concession to achieve it. And it is therefore only natural that both Azerbaijanis and Turks actively support Pashinyan, while withholding support from any force that might come to power and declare that there are red lines in Armenia’s relations with Russia and that these relations will not be revised, at the same time, there are no significant expectations from the West as a substitute for Russia. This, in my view, is the overall picture,” the political scientist concludes.

Contributed by Anna Vardanyan, an Armenian political journalist and researcher with over 18 years’ experience in defence policy, international relations, and security in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, has worked for Armenian media and held advisory roles in the National Assembly of Armenia.