Armenia goes to the polls on June 7, framed as a referendum on Armenia’s post-war identity. The elections are unfolding in an atmosphere shaped by the aftermath of the Washington Agreement, concluded in August 2025, a peace deal concluding the 2023 Second Karabakh War. Polarisation and political distrust abound. But who will win the elections in Yerevan is not the question for Baku. The commitment to the September 2023 status quo is the question.

The incumbent government of Prime Minister Pashinyan is putting forward a “real Armenia” narrative, the notion that Armenia needs to leave conflict behind and focus on socioeconomic development with its neighbours, accepting its current territorial borders. The opposition views an element of “stab-in-back” in the 2023 defeat and wants to carve out a trajectory of self-reliance that places less trust in Ankara and Baku. Azerbaijan has a definite position but has been careful not to fuel polarisation by communicating its specific preferences. 

Caucasus Watch reached out to one of the senior negotiators in Baku, Ahmad Alili is a public policy researcher and the Director of the Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre (CPAC), who has been working towards a negotiated settlement between Yerevan and Baku since 2007. He is not part of the generation of peace builders that emerged after the six-week war of 2020. Instead, he has worked on conflict management projects as a senior expert since 2012-2013, having witnessed the shifting of the geopolitical context.  He is currently involved in what is often referred to 1.5 track diplomacy. He notes that Baku wants a commitment to peace and the status quo but is willing to be agnostic as to “who” and provide ample leeway as to “how” this will be delivered. In sum, Baku keeps an eye on the road but is agnostic about the driver, somewhat, perhaps. 

What is 1.5 track diplomacy? 

Participants in this track understand in depth the diplomatic process and have the experience to support it. The process engages former diplomats, advisors, political figures, prominent journalists, of recognised expertise and influence. For instance, in the Azerbaijani team we have involved individuals like Eldar Namazov, aide to the late President Heydar Aliyev, or Mehman Aliyev, the Director of Turan Information Agency. As an expert, I often take part in Azerbaijani expert delegations. On the other side, you have equivalent figures of recognised status. For instance, let me reference of Dr Stepan Grigoryan, former Deputy Chief of Mission of the Armenian Embassy in Moscow. 

Such groups have a range of missions. We can work on scenario building, providing diplomats with options, test ideas until they reach a level of maturity and can be introduced on the negotiating agenda, or discuss public communication strategies. These parallel negotiating processes are often hosted by convening platforms of recognised expertise and track record, like International Alert. Local actors play a convening role as well, like the press clubs. 

Azerbaijani officials insist that the roadmap to the ratification of the August 2025 Washington Agreement requires the revision of the Armenian Constitution to ensure there is no claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. There is no Plan B. Help us understand: is a constitutional amendment a legal precondition, a political precondition, or a psychological assurance. 

Azerbaijan needs a clear commitment that the Armenian government’s position is grounded in Armenian society. What Baku seeks is evidence of that public support. If that is not the case, then the peace process is in jeopardy. 

It's a political rather than legal precondition that is put forward by President Aliyev. This entails a strong psychological component. Baku is convinced that the 2011 talks in Kazan could have led to an early resolution. Instead, the perception is that Yerevan backtracked. 

By the same token, Baku is convinced that President Serzh Sargsyan did not own up to his commitments during the 2014-2016 peace process, leading the country to instability. In fact, many believe that he stepped aside for Pashinyan in 2018 to avoid political responsibility. In sum, there is a conviction in Azerbaijan that Yerevan does not always stay the course in peace negotiations and diplomats will, at times, “throw table out of the window.” That is the perception. 

So, the constitutional guarantees Baku seeks have a political and psychological motivation. Baku wants to make sure that the Armenian leadership takes a public-facing commitment. The fact that the Prime Minister is taking the substance of the Washington Agreement to the campaign trail goes a long way in that respect. 

If the nature of the assurances sought is political and psychological, can we envisage alternatives routes to the same desired ends? Can we envisage for instance international guarantees that would play a similar role to constitutional reform. Or does a locally owned bilateral process exclude third party guarantors?

Positive and credible contributions by international actors are in practice acceptable. When Baku speaks against international involvement, the main motive is to protect the negotiating process. For instance, President Trump’s offer to facilitate the talks and provide a platform for connectivity guarantees was accepted. 

Since December 2023 both sides have committed to the bilateral nature of the negotiations. Baku has considerable mistrust of multilateral frameworks. But third parties are not excluded in principle. There is a case-by-case approach. 

Any negotiation requires a degree of constructive ambiguity. The range of interpretations needs to be locally owned. Azerbaijan doesn't want to have repetition of the November 10, 2020, three party statement (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia). At the time, there was no consensus over the stipulated obligation of Armenia to pull out troops, for instance, with Yerevan being ambiguous about the status of Karabakh as opposed to regular Armenian troops. Then there was a divergence of what we understand by “connectivity guarantees” or what was initially referred in Baku as the Zangezur corridor. This led to an escalatory ladder that brought us to September 2023. 

Today, Baku wants a consensus between the parties on how terms and conditions are understood, without ambiguities. That is the substance of Baku’s calling for the amendment of the Armenian Constitution. 

Realistically, however, third party guarantees if by that we mean international organisation could be precarious. We are unsure the OSCE will survive the Russia-Ukraine War for instance. Similarly, UN institutions are colliding with the US Administration, and their relevance is being tested. The EU will often take a position, which might be challenged by the European Parliament. So, if we need to find a formula that builds resilience and consensus, these forums may not be ideal at present. 

Given the Armenian and US/EU political cycles, do you see a time frame for ratifying the Washington Agreement? Is there a “last train” moment? 

President Trump's presidency is seen as one strict time frame. Frankly speaking, the time frame is evolving. If you asked me the same question in October 2025, I would say we have a decade before us, given Washington’s failure to broker an agreement in Ukraine. However, if that conflict were to end, there would be consequences for the Washington Agreement. 

Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Aliyev see eye to eye in terms of the broader geopolitical vision. When the opposition in Armenia see this alignment of views as a betrayal of Armenia, I am disappointed. In my view, there is a genuine alignment of strategic visions. As the world changes, the region needs to pull together. The two countries need to make their agreement more resilient to external shocks, or risk seeing this agreement as collateral damage. Theoretically, one may point to President Trump’s Presidency. In practice, we may need to move faster. 

Let's look at the pathways for ratification and what would we consider realistic. There are two pathways for the amendment of the Armenian constitution:  either a two thirds parliamentary majority in the forthcoming parliamentary elections or signatures by ten percent of the electorate (roughly 200,000). That is what you need to call a referendum. My understanding is that Baku's position is that there is no plan B. But let's say there is no Plan B unless Plan A has been exhausted. Would you agree? 

Every negotiation begins from a maximalist position before articulating a foldback position. That is the nature of diplomacy. In this case, we can assume that Baku might tolerate a slightly increased time frame for the constitutional change but not abandon the idea of constitutional reform. The countries might linger in a ‘de facto’ peace limbo, on the basis of the peace deal initialled in Washington but not signed. Baku and Yerevan can still find ways to keep the peace process alive.

First, we need to see whether elections will bring back a revisionist power in office in Yerevan. Baku is supportive of a positive momentum. A government that stands behind the peace agreement, irrespectively of whether that is the incumbent government, will find support in Baku. Of course, the ideal position for Baku is a clear change of the constitution. 

Just to clarify: is an amendment of the constitution a prerequisite for ratification? Armenian government officials decouple the two issues: they argue that the latter does no necessitate the former.

Armenia and Azerbaijan initialled a document in August 2025. That's done. That will not change. Now, either the foreign ministers or the heads of state need to sign it. Ratification follows. Technically, that is a two-step process. It may be one and the same, but the two may also be separate.

There are voices in Armenia and Azerbaijan arguing that we could sign the document and leave the question of ratification for a later date. These are consequential voices. Baku may consider this, if it signals that Armenia has scope for manoeuvre and free will, to strengthen the hand of the government. That is possible, not certain. It will depend on contextual factors. 

How does Azerbaijani public opinion react to the real Armenia narrative, with Yerevan as a partner rather than an enemy? Is anyone convinced?

The Azerbaijani public sees in Pashinyan an authentic voice. Historically, the established worldview is that Armenia has enemies, these are Turkey and Azerbaijan, and the country needs to protect itself.  That means Armenia needs a Russian military base, strong cooperation with Iran, etc.

Prime Minister Pashinyan says, “these are neighbours, we want to do business with them, and we want to make Armenia less dependent on external powers that want us to fight against Turkey and Azerbaijan.” That’s a big difference in worldviews.

I remember like that an assistant to former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan used to say that following every visit from Ankara, the next day, he would always receive calls or visits from several Ambassadors. They would enquire about relations with the Turks and he would brief them. Once, he said, “I told them that everything is great and we are about to open the borders in a couple of weeks.” According to him, they were gobsmacked and asked him whether he recalls the genocide. The point is that peace with Azerbaijan means Russia loses the ability to station troops, Iran loses an important lever. Some neighbours gain from conflict, others from peace. 

During negotiations, do you feel you are ahead of public sentiment, reflecting public sentiment, or succumbing to the pressure of public opinion?

Public opinion is more emotionally volatile. Diplomats and experts keep a level-headed approach and realise the geopolitical context of their negotiation. 

The geopolitical fluidity of the current environment is in some respects positive. Yerevan and Baku understand that with the world in flux, regional consolidation is more necessary than ever. We need each other. 

Looking a bit deeper into this observation: what does Russia lose if the Washington agreement is ratified?

During the 2020 Karabakh war, Russia was not among the losers. Russia managed to bring in its own troops to Karabakh. This was beneficial to Baku. The Russian presence in Karabakh in September 2023 shielded Baku from accusations of atrocities.

Peace means Russia loses the South Caucasus, unable to influence Armenia or Azerbaijan. Russia can no longer assert in Europe, the United States, or vis-à-vis Turkey that this is its sphere of influence. That is significant. Even during the US-Iran War, President Putin attempted several times to insert himself into the process as a mediator, which President Trump refused. 

The Washington process has left a range of bilateral issues open. Border delimitation and connectivity are still being negotiated. Are all these dependent variables on the ratification of the Washington Agreement or can we see progress while the ratification is being negotiated.

We have shown the ability to compartmentalise some issues, even if there is a spill over across the negotiating agenda. What we referred to as the “Zangezur Corridor” in 2024 – a name, Armenians did not welcome – was left for the tail end of negotiations.  The issue of border demarcation and detainees have been treated separately. 

What is added to the text is a strategic vision, how Baku, Yerevan, and Washington can develop a new relationship, a process that was seeded during the Biden era but was now delivered. 

The Washington process is about three projects. In a sense, the agreement entailed copy -pasting the ninth article of the November 2020 three party statement, mediated by Russia, without any additions, signed by President Trump. 

Many of our European partners at times view President Trump as unpredictable. The August 2025 meeting demonstrated how skilfully the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan were able to engage and negotiate with President Trump at the White House. The outcome ultimately served both US interests and broader regional interests in the South Caucasus.

If the agreement fails, how does the South Caucasus look like in five years?

“Failing” is too broad a term. It's not about ‘if’ agreement fails but ‘how’ it should fail. So, the agreement could fail because Russia makes an assertive comeback in Armenian politics. Another thought circulating is that the economy develops with Western support, deterrence becomes possible, and Armenia walks back from its agreement. 

If Azerbaijan sees the coming to office of a government committed to the peace agreement, there is going to be leeway as to which path it can follow. If Prime Minister Pashinyan walks back from his commitments, there will be anger. Azerbaijan will lose confidence in any negotiation process. 

How peace fails will determine what happens next, if we are to think along these lines. To be clear, I believe that Baku can tolerate any a deviation from the agreed roadmap, if this is not perceived as a path towards a revanchist trajectory and the coming to office of a revisionist political project. Baku’s red line is the status quo as of September 2023.

There was a perception in Baku that Yerevan sought to alter the November 2020 status quo, which ultimately led to the events of September 2023. Any attempt to revise the post-September 2023 status quo would likely be viewed through a similar lens. From this perspective, even the personality or political orientation of a potential new Armenian leadership is of secondary importance, so long as there is no attempt to challenge the September 2023 status quo.

What do Western policy makers consistently misunderstand about Azerbaijan's position?

Policy development in Baku is not public facing, but it is shaped by its own internal logic, much of which may remain invisible to outside observers. I have seen many surprised reactions when explaining the reasoning behind certain foreign policy decisions that, at first glance, appeared to lack any clear logic or strategic rationale. In some respects, it is a bit like Brussels. When you are in Brussels, you feel you understand how it works. As soon as you leave, you no longer do. 

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis for Caucasus Watch