Georgia's strategic position in the South Caucasus and Black Sea region has become increasingly complex. The war in Ukraine, the Iran-Israel conflict, and shifting American priorities are reshaping Western engagement with the region at the precise moment when Tbilisi must navigate critical regional rivalries and competition for strategic relevance. What realistic and vital options remain for Georgia in this dynamic security and geopolitical environment is the central question.

The resulting strategic dilemmas are addressed and extensively discussed in this interview with Natia Seskuria, Senior Research Fellow and Programme Lead in Russian and Eurasian Security at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), as well as Founder and Executive Director of the Regional Institute for Security Studies (RISS), the Tbilisi-based think tank, who assesses Georgia's positioning across international and regional fronts.

Western unity in Ukraine has shown visible cracks. If support for Kyiv fractures further, what does that mean for Georgia – a country that has already seen its EU and NATO trajectory stall, and how should Tbilisi calibrate and reposition itself in a landscape of growing geopolitical and security ambiguity?

Despite the Trump administration's attempts to broker negotiations and bring the parties to the table, the peace process has clearly stalled. I have always been skeptical about this diplomatic track, because Putin has never demonstrated any genuine willingness to make meaningful concessions. His demands remain maximalist, and there is no indication that his core calculus has shifted. On the contrary, the talks looked more like a tactical opportunity for the Kremlin to engage directly with Washington, frame its agenda as “reasonable,” and shift responsibility onto Kyiv when the process inevitably broke down. At the same time, we have not seen the United States fully exploit its available leverage over Russia, which makes a prolonged war the most likely scenario.

This raises the uncomfortable question of whether long‑term Western unity in support of Ukraine is sustainable. European allies are working hard to sustain Kyiv’s war effort. Still, the pressure is undeniable as transatlantic cohesion has already been eroded, and political support in Washington for large‑scale, direct assistance is visibly declining. The outbreak of war with Iran has further complicated matters by opening a second theatre that ranks higher on the US priority list. It has also underlined the hard reality that key high‑end capabilities such as Patriot interceptors, stand‑off munitions, and ISR platforms are finite and are now being re‑prioritized to bolster partners in the Gulf. This dynamic creates a more unstable regional environment for Georgia, while the outcome of the war in Ukraine will ultimately shape Russia’s posture in our neighborhood.

Yet even amid these cracks, there remains a strong understanding among many European allies that the future of Europe’s security architecture is being decided in Ukraine. For Georgia, this should have been a strategic opening. We could have positioned ourselves more clearly as a frontline state when it comes to Russian active measures - from disinformation and cyber operations to occupation of our territories - and used that role to deepen cooperation with partners focused on resilience against Russian aggression. At the same time, the renewed

Western interest in Black Sea connectivity and diversification away from Russian energy and transport routes has created another window of opportunity. Georgia is well placed to benefit from this by strengthening its role as a transit, energy, and digital hub that is integral to Europe’s efforts to reduce dependence on Russia.

However, capitalizing on these openings requires repaired and reinforced relationships with our Western partners. The deterioration of trust with key allies has left Georgia increasingly isolated at precisely the moment when being seen as a reliable, aligned, and forward‑leaning partner in an extremely complicated but strategically important region would bring the greatest dividends. In a landscape of growing geopolitical ambiguity, Tbilisi should therefore focus on three things: rebuilding political trust with the EU and individual member states through reversing the current political dynamics; presenting itself openly as part of the frontline against Russian hybrid threats; and embedding itself as deeply as possible in emerging Black Sea connectivity projects. 

Georgia is one of Black Sea littoral states that is neither in NATO nor has a credible security guarantor, yet it hosts an alternative corridor of undersea cables, critical energy pipelines, and digital infrastructure that the entire region and European markets depend on. Does that make Georgia indispensable to European energy security, and if so, why has that not translated into stronger Western security commitments and guarantees toward Tbilisi?

It is true that, in the context of the war in Ukraine, Georgia has become increasingly central to Europe’s evolving energy and connectivity strategy. However, this growing strategic importance has not translated into firm or binding security guarantees from Western partners, revealing a persistent gap between functional relevance and security commitment.

In practical terms, Georgia operates as a critical transit hub linking the Caspian basin and Central Asia to European markets. Major infrastructure corridors, such as the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines, as well as the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline feeding into the Southern Gas Corridor, run through Georgian territory and are designed to bypass routes controlled by Russia. More recently, initiatives such as the Black Sea Submarine Cable project connecting Georgia to Romania have been elevated by the EU as strategically significant, particularly as Europe seeks to diversify not only its gas supplies but also future renewable electricity imports. These projects position Georgia as an essential node in Europe’s broader effort to strengthen long-term energy resilience and reduce structural dependencies.

Yet this functional indispensability has not been matched by equivalent security commitments. The reasons are complex. Firstly, Western governments have historically shown a clear willingness to invest in infrastructure that enhances diversification and connectivity, but far greater caution when it comes to extending binding security guarantees in regions where doing so could entail direct confrontation with Russia. In Georgia’s case, this hesitation is especially pronounced given the continued presence of Russian forces on approximately 20 percent of its territory and their proximity to key infrastructure projects.

A second factor lies in domestic political dynamics. Multiple political crises within Georgia, along with tensions in its relations with Western partners, have seriously complicated the country’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory. While Georgia’s strategic importance is not in question, internal instability, anti-Western rhetoric, and sharp deterioration of relations with the West reinforce the caution in Brussels and other Western capitals, making them less inclined to deepen security commitments or accelerate integration pathways.

Finally, there is a broader conceptual gap in Western policymaking. Energy security and Black Sea security continue to be treated as parallel rather than interdependent domains. This lack of integration has prevented the emergence of a coherent regional strategy, even as infrastructure investments continue to expand. In contrast, Russia’s approach to the Black Sea has been consistent and strategic, combining military presence with long-term geopolitical objectives. As long as this mismatch persists, Western engagement is likely to remain uneven - robust in economic and infrastructural terms but limited in the security domain. 

Bridging this gap would require a final shift in Western risk tolerance vis-à-vis Russia, a clearer alignment between connectivity strategy and regional security thinking, and greater political convergence with Georgia itself. 

The collapse of Armenian control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the accelerating pace of Azerbaijan's regional assertiveness have fundamentally redrawn the South Caucasus security map in ways that receive insufficient attention in Western capitals. Georgia shares borders with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, depends on Azerbaijani energy corridors, and sits inside a neighborhood that is being restructured faster than any external framework can accommodate. How does Tbilisi manage its exposure to a rapidly shifting regional balance in which neither of its southern neighbors is a stable or predictable partner?

Georgia’s immediate neighborhood is indeed undergoing a rapid and consequential transformation. The US-brokered peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, following Azerbaijan’s swift military victory and the resolution of a decades-long frozen conflict, has significantly weakened Russia’s traditional leverage in the region. This marks a notable shift in the South Caucasus security landscape and should be treated as an opportunity from the Georgian perspective. 

Unlike during Donald Trump’s first presidency, when the South Caucasus received limited attention, the current approach reflects a more direct American engagement. Initiatives such as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) signal an effort to embed the region within broader US connectivity and economic strategies. A more present United States offers regional states alternative pathways in energy, trade, and investment, which should eventually include even elements of security cooperation - pathways that do not run exclusively through Russia or Iran. For Georgia, this diversification creates new economic opportunities and expands the scope for engagement with Washington.

At the regional level, increased US involvement can contribute to a more stable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan by introducing economic incentives for cooperation. Georgia’s position within this evolving dynamic has been consistent: Tbilisi maintains solid bilateral relations with both neighbors and has deliberately framed itself as a neutral actor that supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both states while avoiding alignment towards either side. 

With more positive dynamics of US engagement in the region, an immediate challenge has emerged for Tbilisi. Despite its central geographic and infrastructural role, Georgia is increasingly being excluded from key strategic discussions surrounding US-led connectivity initiatives in the region. This is reflected in the intensity of diplomatic engagement between Washington and Georgia’s neighbors, often without parallel inclusion of Tbilisi. These developments have been preceded by the suspension of the US–Georgia strategic partnership, the restoration of which should be a priority if Georgia aims to reinsert itself into these evolving regional frameworks.

Ultimately, while the regional environment is opening new opportunities through diversification and US engagement, Georgia’s ability to benefit from these shifts will depend on its capacity to shift current negative dynamics in Georgia-US relations.

Russia is simultaneously waging war in Ukraine while maintaining occupation of twenty percent of Georgian territory. If the war concludes, whether through ceasefire, frozen conflict, or Russian consolidation, how does that change the threat calculus for Georgia specifically, and does a post-Ukraine Russia pose a more serious and focused challenge to Georgian strategic security than the one Georgia faces today?

Regardless of when the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will continue to pursue a deeply rooted objective to maintain influence across its immediate neighborhood. However, the trajectory of the war will directly shape with what kind of intensity that objective is pursued in Georgia.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has already transformed the broader security environment in which Georgia operates. The repeated failure of ceasefire and peace initiatives reflects not a lack of diplomatic engagement, but a lack of genuine willingness on the part of the Kremlin to compromise. Russia does not appear to believe that it needs a negotiated settlement. Instead, it is pursuing a strategy based on endurance by seeking to outlast Western support for Ukraine rather than achieving rapid battlefield breakthroughs. In this context, negotiations function less as pathways to conflict resolution and more as instruments to shift blame onto Kyiv and deepen divisions within the West.

For Georgia, this dynamic is critical because it suggests that the war is unlikely to end in a clear settlement. Even if Russia fails to achieve its maximalist objectives, such as full control over the Donbas region or forcing Ukraine into neutrality, it is unlikely to pivot toward a genuine peace. A more plausible outcome is a prolonged, lower-intensity conflict or a frozen arrangement that preserves instability and limits Ukraine’s long-term strategic options.

The key question for Georgia, therefore, is how Russia reallocates its strategic attention. At present, Ukraine absorbs a substantial share of Russia’s military, political, and cognitive bandwidth. If the conflict transitions into a frozen or less resource-intensive phase, Moscow will have greater capacity to refocus on its immediate neighborhood, including Georgia.

Importantly, Russia’s objectives in Georgia remain unchanged from before the war. Moscow continues to view Georgia as part of its sphere of influence and seeks to prevent its deeper integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, as well as the consolidation of a democratic and economically diversified state.

This does not necessarily translate into a high likelihood of military escalation. Rather, the threat is more likely to become increasingly targeted, multidimensional, and sustained. Russia already possesses significant leverage through its occupation of Georgian territory, and in a post-Ukraine context, it is likely to intensify the use of hybrid tools such as a combination of political pressure, economic influence, election interference, information operations, and calibrated provocations along the occupation lines. These are not new tactics, but well-established methods that Georgia has long been exposed to.

In this sense, the conclusion of the war in Ukraine - particularly in the form of a frozen or inconclusive outcome - would not reduce the threat to Georgia. Instead, it would likely result in a more focused and less distracted Russia, capable of applying pressure with greater consistency and precision across the South Caucasus. For Georgia’s national interests, the most favorable outcome of the war in Ukraine would be one in which Russia emerges with significantly reduced capacity to project military power and sustain coercive influence. This would involve a combination of economic strain, military degradation, and strategic overextension that limits Moscow’s ability to refocus attention on other theatres.

Interview conducted by Luka Okropirashvili for Caucasus Watch