For years, Pakistan was the only UN member state to withhold recognition of the Republic of Armenia since the state’s independence in 1991. This stance was rooted in solidarity with Azerbaijan over the question of Nagorno-Karabakh, alignment with Turkey over the question of the Armenian genocide, and an implicit ‘in-principle’ strategic message over its own dispute with India over the question of Kashmir. 

The 2025 in-principle peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington removed the central obstacle to Pakistan’s recognition. Islamabad began re-evaluating its position, and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar initiated contact with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, culminating in a Joint Communiqué signed on August 31, 2025, in Tianjin, China. Dr Attiq ur Rehman suggests that the background of this agreement may entail an unstated mediator, namely China. 

Given the strength of the Three Brothers Alliance, it was clear this would happen with Baku’s consent and Turkey’s tacit approval. The relevance of China in that respect is not self-evident. A broader diplomatic domino effect is unfolding as power cards in the Trans-Caspian region are reshuffled. The diplomatic significance of the Armenian recognition may be greater than meets the eye, considering Pakistan’s ambition to join the Eurasian Union, and Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s parallel bid for membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. 

To discuss the context of this agreement, Caucasus Watch reached out to Dr Attiq ur Rehman, Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations at the National University of Modern Languages (NUML) in Islamabad, specialising in Strategic Studies and International Relations. He also consults the Pakistani government on its regional security policy. His analysis extends to Pakistan’s ties to the post-Soviet space, including Central Asia and the Caucasus. Earlier in his career (2013-2014), he was posted as a research fellow at Baku’s Centre for Strategic Studies (SAM), an institution that the Air Centre has since succeeded. He continues to develop contacts with Azerbaijan and is a “go-to” commentator for regional developments for both Pakistani and, occasionally, Azerbaijani media outlets. 

What are the geopolitical threads that bring a Pakistani Security Analyst to Baku? 

Pakistan and Azerbaijan share a turbulent and at times uncomfortable engagement with Iran. The two countries are both members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and our foreign and security policies are aligned. There is an exceptional alignment between the two governments. Initially, we faced comparable challenges: Karabakh for Azerbaijan and Kashmir for Pakistan. 

Does Pakistan see Armenia exclusively through the lens of the Three Brothers partnership? Should we see Islamabad’s normalisation of ties with Yerevan as a collateral effect of the normalisation of relations between Baku and Yerevan? 

Yes. But foreign policy is often a multifactorial exercise. Neat, black-and-white categorizations rarely work. The first complication is that we cannot really decouple bilateral from minilateral or multilateral engagements. Pakistan has a longstanding dispute with India over Kashmir; Azerbaijan had a directly comparable challenge with Armenia. This is why Pakistan was very supportive of Baku, not least by withholding recognition of Armenia. Azerbaijan, in turn, has supported Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir, even while maintaining a cooperative partnership with India in other respects. However, there are diplomatic consequences emanating from this recognition that may be of more immediate importance to Islamabad’s interests. 

Am I correct in thinking that Islamabad is seeking membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union? Theoretically, Armenia could stand in the way. 

Yes, recognising Armenia probably lifts a burden from Islamabad’s bid to join the Eurasian Union. However, we need to view things through a broader lens. Relationships in the region move quickly. India, for instance, both competes and cooperates with China. Pakistan’s entry into the Eurasian Union is not reliant on Armenia’s recognition. We would find a way to make it work, regardless. 

Concurrently, Azerbaijan and Armenia are seeking membership in the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation). How does Pakistan’s recognition of Armenia relate to this? 

There is a broader context here, as this recognition was concluded in China. When China mediated a deal between Tehran and Riyadh, the diplomatic community wondered if this model would be more broadly replicated in South Asia, not least between India and Pakistan. China's approach to the international system differs significantly from the path taken by great powers in the past. China may be willing to play a more dynamic role. 

So, are you arguing that in this normalisation, we should be looking at China as much as we look to Turkey as the unstated mediator? 

If we step back and consider the parallel paths of Armenia and Azerbaijan towards SCO membership, China emerges as a significant factor. China’s tacit commitment to regional security is undoubtedly a factor, whether this is implicit or explicit. Either way, it is essential. The Saudi-Iranian mediation sent a message to the world that China is more than a trading nation. Therefore, as mediators, they possess exceptional resources and the capacity to make a significant impact. 

How does Iran factor into this dynamic?

A third direct link for Pakistan to the region is its shared border with Iran, which Armenia also borders. Currently, the entire Muslim world is focused on the Gaza crisis, Israel and Hamas. Iran is seen as an extension of this crisis. In this context, Pakistan’s recognition of Armenia is not a central issue. However, the region’s relationship with Iran is, of course, evolving. 

The corridor crisis was at the epicentre of talks in Washington, as the demand for opening a Zangezur corridor obviously affects both Azerbaijan and Iran. Another element is the relationship between Azerbaijan and Israel. Meanwhile, the Iranian-Armenian cooperative nexus is also changing. Iran’s relationship with Yerevan is a matter of political necessity. If the regional framework is changing, Iran’s position vis-à-vis Armenia will also change. 

For Pakistan, these matters affect the regional order. We are compartmentalizing our relations while remaining attentive to regional dynamics. The unpredictability of the Israeli position is affecting the entire nexus of the Abraham Accords, and all regional alignments could be redrawn, including relations between Armenia and India, Pakistan and Armenia, and Iran and Armenia. Our approach to this bilateral relationship is part of a broader, global strategy. Pakistan’s priority is to increase the predictability of its security environment and improve relations with all major powers, including the US, particularly in the aftermath of the war with India. 

Within the Three Brothers Alliance, Pakistan is a significant force, being a nuclear and major military power. This alliance, in some respects, echoes India’s web of alliances with Israel and the United States. How important is the Three Brothers Alliance in this fluctuating environment? 

Currently, the Three Brothers Alliance is a central focus of our foreign policy, as it has proven to be battle-tested. We fought a war with India, and Turkey and Azerbaijan were instrumental in Pakistan’s effort. But there is a broader discussion on minilateralism that goes far beyond common military exercises. Diplomatic sources suggest the Three Brothers framework is open to expansion. 

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis